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Firm Heterogeneity, Internal Finance, and Credit Rationing
ABSTRACT
Assessing the extent to which agents or firms face capital—market
imperfections and quantity restrictions on credit is crucial for measuring
intertemporal tradeoffs in consumption or the cost of capital for investment.
In contrast to standard price-clearing, "full-information" models of loan
markets, in models of credit allocation where information is imperfect (which
we describe as "information—intensive"), "the interest rate" need not reflect
the shadow price of credit in financial intermediation. Credit rationing to
some borrowers is likely.
In actual markets, many loan contracts are offered, both
"full-information" and "information Intensive." our focus in this paper is on
firm heterogeneity in credit markets; we analyze mechanisms by which credit
markets sort borrowers in the presence of differing degrees of asymmetric
information; we emphasize the potential for credit rationing in equilibrium
and the response of credit allocation to borrower-specific shocks. Our
approach suggests that external finance will be differentially available to
entrepreneurs ——holding constant their project opportunities --accordingto
their internal net worth position. that is, there is an important link for
many firms between internal finance and investment spending.
We develop a simple general equilibrium model of credit mllocation, in
which different loan contracts are offered to different types of borrowers.
The extent to which different borrowers can obtain credit depends on the
distribution of internal finance, aggregate net worth levels, and whether
projects are observable. While credit restrictions to some classes of
borrowers are a feature of a multiple—contract equilibrium, the severity can
vary substantially in response to financial disturbances. We consider shocks
to borrowers' net worth. Credit restrictions may occur in response to a
deterioration of net—worth positions. A "credit collapse," in which no loans
are offered to certain types of borrowers is possible. Investment and financing
decisions are not, in general independent. We discuss implications for tax
policy and for public policy toward financial institutions.
Charles W. Calomiris R. Glenn Hubbard
Department of Econoaics NBER
Northwestern University aoso Massachusetts Avenue
2003 Sheridan Road Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Evanston, Illinois 60201 (617) 868—39001.IntroductIon
Assessing the extent to which agents or firms face capital—market
imperfections and quantity restrictions on credit is crucial for measuring
intertemporal tradeoffs in consumption or the cost of capital for investment.
The ability of individual firms to participate actively in capital markets is
an important factor in models which use prices in centralized securities
markets as measures of the marginal cost of capital.
In a standard Walrasian, "full-information" model of loan markets,
factors determining asset supplies and demands fix interest rates, which then
constitute the set of shadow prices for credit in various markets. In
contrast to this price-clearing, full-information framework, models of loan
markets where information is imperfect (which we describe here as
"information—intensive" sectors) have emphasized that "the interest rate" need
not reflect the shadow price of credit in financial intermediation and that
credit rationing to some borrowers is likely (Jaffee and Russell, 1976;
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; bernanke, 1983: Blinder, 1987; Williamson, 1985,
1987). Friedman (1982) has noted a strong empirical link between credit
availability and economic activity.1
In actual markets, many loan contracts are offered, both
"full—information" and "information—intensive," Our focus in this paper is on
firm heterogeneity in credit markets; we analyze mechanisms by which credit
markets sort borrowers In the presence of differing degrees of asymmetric
information across types of entrepreneur—borrowers.2 We model the allocation
of credit to heterogeneous entrepreneurs with different endowments of
internal equity and project opportunities.—2
Our multiple—credit-markets approach suggests that external finance will
be differentially available to entrepreneurs —-holdingconstant their project
opportunities ——accordingto their internal net worth position. That is,
there is an Important link for many firms between internal finance and
investment spending.3 This result has implications for determinants of
crass-sectional variation in investment behavior among firms of various sizes,
from which single-credit market models of investment behavior necessarily
abstract. Srini Vasan (1986, Chapter 3), using data on 'small," "medium," and
"large" U.S. manufacturing firms, demonstrates that such cross-sectional
variation is empirically important -—bothin terms of the basic determinants
of investment and the cyclical sensitivity of investment.4 Similar findings
based on a panel of manufacturing firms are obtained by Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1987a), who distinguish between investment decisions of firms with
low levels of internal equity relative to investment demand and firms for
which cash flows exceed investment demand.
We develop a simple general equilibrium model of credit allocation, and
analyze the operation of an economy-wide "mutual fund," which invests funds
deposited by risk-neutral individuals in project loans. The extent to which
different groups of borrowers can obtain credit depends on individual net
worth positions, whether projects are observable, and on individual and
aggregate net worth levels. Aggregate disturbances can have allocative
effects on loan markets, While credit restrictions to some types of
entrepreneurs are a feature of a multiple-contract equilbrium, the severity
can vary substantially in response to financial disturbances. We consider
shocks to borrowers' net worth. Credit restrictions may occur in response to—3-
a deterioration of net-worth positions. Indeed, a "credit collapse," in which
no loans are offered to certain types of borrowers, is possible (see also
Mankiw, 1986).
Recent research has highlighted the development of financial
intermediaries in equilibrium models of credit allocation (see for example
Williamson, 1986). Our interest in this paper is not so much in "banks" as
intermediaries (issuing demandable debt to depositors and making term loans),
but in considering "sufficient statistics" for credit—market conditions in
realistic markets, where both information-intensive and full-information loan
contracts are signed. Our "sufficient statistics" consist of full—information
loan rates and the quantity of credit made available in the information-
intensive sector. These variables have figured prominently in empirical work
(Bernanke, 1983; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1986; Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock,
1986); we derive their role formally here.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II develops a model of
equilibrium credit rationing, and examines the effects of internal finance on
the availability of credit to information-intensive borrowers. We develop a
two-period general equilbirium model of credit allocation, in which both
information-intensive and perfect—information loan contracts are offered.
Implications for public policy toward financial institutions and for the role
of government finance are analyzed in section III; we review some empirical
evidence there.. Conclusions and extensions to dynamic models of debt
maturity, net worth accumulation, and financial institutions are discussed
in section IV.—4-
II. Internal Finance, Credit Allocation, and Investment
Imperfect Information and Credit Allocation
In the simplest possible model, no information problems exist, and the
competitive equilibrium in a Walrasian credit market involves clearing through
"price." Firms borrow to finance projects as long as expected project returns
exceed the cost of borrowed funds in the market, We will assume throughout
this paper that borrowers must finance their investments internally or through
debt (more on this later). The observation by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that
when borrowers have private information about the riskiness of their project
returns, lenders ("banks") cannot necessarily distinguish "good borrowers"
from "bad borrowers" implies that adverse selection may render unprofitable a
credit—market equilibrium in which loan contracts specify only price. That
is, with a nonzero probability of default, banks consider the potential for
loan repayment as well as the interest rate to be charged when assessing the
profitability of a loan. Past some critical interest rate level, banks will
be selected against by borrowers with a high probability of default; quantity
rationing will be part of a competitive equilibrium in the
information—intensive credit market.
The central contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is that imperfect
information can limit the number of loans a lender will make; that is, "credit
rationing" occurs in the sense that within a class of observationally
identical borrowers, not all receive loans. The basic original model is
simple --lenderscan vary only the interest rate; different price-quantity
combinations are ruled out. The profitability of loans to the lender does not
increase uniformly with the interest rate. In particular, reductions in-5-
borrower net worth can precipitate more severe credit rationing in
information—intensive loan markets. Bester (1985) argues that if lenders are
free to use different interest rates and collateral requirements across
borrowers, no credit rationing occurs in equilibrium. It is important to
note, however, that in Bester's model, investors have access to unlimited
collateral --thatis, loans have only a liquidity function (see also than and
Thakor, 1987 in this respect). In the multiple-contract model described
below, we assume that an individual entrepreneur's available internal finance
is given exogenously by his initial endowment and that project size is "large"
relative to individuals' endowments. Under these conditions, the credit
rationing observed in the Stiglita—Weiss model will occur for some classes of
borrowers in equilibrium.
Information and a General Equilibrium Model of Credit Allocation
In reality, many "markets" for credit exist side by side, differing in
types of borrowers and the terms of loans. These markets effectively sort
borrowers along dimensions of both "information intensity" and risk.
Borrowers with significant financial resources and reputations (e.g., the
federal government and large, publicly traded corporations) have access to
"full—information" credit markets (such as those for commercia1 paper or
long-term bonds), while imperfect information characterizes more accurately
the loan market in other sectors.
Our conceptual experiment is to formalize a multiple-contract market—
clearing process. Information—intensive and full—information contracts
coexist. We develop a simple general equilibrium model of credit allocation.-6—
-
Ourfocus is on the important role played by collateral in credit supply
(i.e., borrower internal equity or net worth); we show that considering
variations. in internal equity not only enhances the potential for credit
restrictions relative to standard full—information eodels, but also relative
to the simple single-loan—contract models under imperfect information
previously analyzed in the literature. Aggregate credit supply shocks have
allocative effects in such a world, with quantity restrictions applied to
borrowers participating in the information-intensive market, and price
rationing of credit to higher—quality (less information—intensive) borrowers.
If substitution in production across business activities is limited in the
short run (i.e., if General Motors cannot immediately enter farming), credit
restrictions to individuals will have real effects on investment (see for
example Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock, 1986).
We consider a stylized credit market with different borrowers indexed by
(i) internal net worth, (ii) returns on project opportunities, and
(iii) observability of projects by potential lenders. The model has two
periods,during which investment and consumption are undertaken, respectively.
In the first period, each of the countable infinity of agents is endowed with
some amount of collateral and an "investment project." Consumption takes
place during the second period. Individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral
over consumption decisions. A key feature of the model is that investment
projects are individual-specific, indivisible, and large relative to
entrepreneurs' net worth.5 Project technologies are either "observable" or
"not observable."6 Actual project returns are observable ex post.
We assume equal numbers of individuals with access to each of three
project types ——1,2, and W. Project opportunities 1 and 2 are—7-
indistinguishable to lenders, while project opportunity W is observable.
Endowments of entrepreneurs with access to projects I and 2 is denoted by Ck.
with an equal number of high (k=H) and low (k=L) endowment types within each
information—intensive project clmssification. Full-information borrowers have
identical endowments A fourth group of individuals are pure savers; that
is, they have no project opportunity. They have identical net worth C5. Thus
entrepreneurs (those individuals with project opportunities) divide into five
groups, which differ according to project opportunities and collateral
endowments. There are, however4 only three observable classes of borrowers:
Walrasimn (W); high-endowment, information—intensive (1H); and low-endowment,
information—intensive (1L)
On the supply side of the credit market, individuals either invest their
endowments directly in their own projects or turn their endowments over to a
central mutual fund, which offers different contracts to different borrowers.
Savers deposit their endowments in the mutual fund. The "mutual fund' is a
convenient fiction for a large number of competing mutual funds. That is,
rents from successful projects accrue to successful entrepreneurs, not to
lenders. We employ the fiction of an economy-wide mutual fund rather than
focus on developing various financial intermediaries endogenously because we
are interested primarily in borrower heterogeneity, in particular credit
allocation over different types of borrowers.7 In the real world, of course,
borrowers may be segmented in different loan markets and shocks which are
specific to particular loan markets ——forexample, a contraction of
high-powered money --willalso have important effects on the allocation of
investment funds (see Bernanke, 1983; and Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock,
1986).—8-
Ge Meza and Webb (1987) show that the adverse selection problem which
gives rise to credit rationing in Stiglit2 and Weiss (1981) can be eliminated
through the use of equity finance in a model in which entrepreneurs share
identical expected project returns. Ge Meza and Webb demonstrate, however,
that when projects' expected returns differ, debt finance is optimal because
it avoids the "lemons-market" disadvantages inherent in external equity
finance (as, for example, in Myers and Majluf, j9$4),8 In order to abstract
from equity finance we assume that both expected returns and variances differ
across projects.9 "Good' projects stochastically dominate "bad" projects. We
consider only fixed-rate debt contracts between borrowers and lenders.10
The three projects are described as follows. The observable project (W)
has a mean gross return and a distribution of returns given by F CR). The
two projects in the information—intensive (I) sector —— and12 -—havemean
gross returns of and A,respectively,and distributions of returns,
F1(R) and F2(R), respectively. Mean gross returns are such that
> > R2and >( + Ri).
(Following the logic of de Meza and Webb
(1987), one could assume that project I earns with probability p1 and zero
otherwise, while project 12 earns R2 with probability p2 and zero otherwise,
where p1 >p2
and R1 >R2.)
When the project's gross return is less than the amount borrowed to
finance investment, the individual loses his equity in the project. Because
of this "limited liability" assumption, the lower bound on the gross return
for an entrepreneur is zero. Bankruptcy occurs if
R<(1+i)S,
where the lender receives R and where i is the interest rate charged and S is-9-
the amount of the loan. $ equals (X —C),where X is project size, and C is
the level of internal net worth. Let p be the (endogenous) equilibrium
expected return from a mutual fund share, so that Ck(l +) isthe opportunity
cost of investing one's endowment, k =L,14,W,S.An individual of type (k,I)
will borrow to finance his project if his expected profit from so doing
exceeds his opportunity cost, that is, if
(1) Irk,2 =/ max[Il—(1.4ik) O]dF2(R) >C(l
+);kH,L,W;11,2,W.
F1 is the distribution function of returns. For pure savers, the expected
gross return from mutual fund investment in the first period is Ck(l +p).
The question arises of whether projects will be partially financed
directly by investors' endowments, or financed fully by loans from the mutual
fund in which all endowments are deposited (see also de Meza and Webb, 1987).
Under the assumption of risk neutrality there will be no motive for
diversification (which would make internal finance unattractive). Investors
with project I opportunities will always prefer to invest in their own project
rather than earn the average rate of return (marginal rate of interest on
loans) from the mutual fund because all mean project returns are less than or
equal to that of their own projects. Project 2 borrowers will imitate project
i types in their credit market behavior —-otherwisethey would reveal their
identity. Thus all information-intensive borrowers who receive loans will use
their endowments to fund a portion of their projects. Information-intensive
borrowers who do not receive loans will deposit their endowments in the mutual
fund. These conditions mean that in equilibrium all information—intensive
borrowers who engage in projects will borrow only the amount needed to finance-10-
the project over and above their initial endowments. Of course, i'i-type
borrowers will also self-finance, so long as the equilibrium expected rate of
return in the mutual fund is lower than or equal to the return on their
projects. The decision to self-finance does not affect the equilibrium
allocation of credit, since self-finance is contingent on receiving a loan.
Only the distribution of profits, not the allocation of funds, is affected by
self—financing.
The expected profitability to the mutual fund of loans received by each
(observable or unobservable) project class 1 is given 9k1' where
(2) Pk,,Sk,, =fThin [(1 +ik)skIR] dF1(R); k =Ii,L,W;11,2,W;
Where Ski =- C.Because of the possibility of default, the profitability
of the loan is dependent on the amount of the internal net worth of the
borrower. Ex post non-pecuniary penalties are excluded by assumption.
Given existing inforaation—intensive net worth levels (again denoted by H
and U, the competitive mutual fund will order its opportunities so that for
all borrowers who receive loans, the rate of profit to the mutual fund is
equivalent; otherwise, competing mutual funds could bid away borrowers.
Investors are interested in obtaining funds as long as their net profits from
project investment are positive.
The asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders leads to an
adverse selection problem in the information-intensive market, as in Stiglitz
and Weiss (1961). That is, in borrower categories within the information—
intensive sector, there exists a maximum loan profit rate p* for lenders, at
which ap/ai =0,given the internal net worth levels for information—intensive—11—
borrowers. That is true because average profitability on loans in the
information-intensive sector depends on the mix of applicants (between project
1 and project 2 borrowers). Over an initial range of i (for a given value of
collateral), ap/ai >0,because as interest rates increase the fund earns more
interest, with no increase in the extent of adverse selection; at interest
rates greater than T,goodborrowers drop out of the market.11 Thus the
maximum profit the fund could make would be achieved by setting i ei (fora
given collateral value) and choosing borrowers from among its pool of
applicants.
The fund's maximum profit rate on information—intensive projects in any
observable collateral class is thus a probability-weighted combination of
the profit rates from loans on unobservable projects 1 and 2:
(3) P*(Cksik) =f(Pl(Ck'k' P2(Ck.ik)). Ck <
wherethe implied weights depend on the mix of applicants. It is because of
this adverse selection problem that borrowers' equity in projects is
important. We denote bythe level of collateral (net worth) at which
information-intensive loan applicants will sort themselves according to true
underlying project returns.12 That is, C is the net worth level such that
(1 i.p)ë
Hencewill depend on the expected mutual fund return .Thehigher is the
opportunity cost of investing one's net worth in a project, the lower will
be the critical net worth level C. When internal net worth is less than
"good"(project 1) and "bad" (project 2) borrowers with low collateral will
not be distinguishable. As net worth rises to C, equation (1) implies that—12—
borrowers with inferior projects will no longer have an incentive to compete
for loans, leaving only good projects in that net worth class to seek loans,
and thus eliminating problems associated with asymmetry of information.
If for some information-intensive borrowers p* is greater than the
expected return on the full-inforaation project alternative (RW) ——thatis,
if >forsome of these borrowers --andif the projects are the ones
receiving fundson the margin, then the equilibrium return on loans to the
information-intensive borrowers, 1 +p,is just equal to R. If exceeds
1 +p--thatis, if Ck <C——forall information—intensive borrowers, then
information—intensive borrowers will be the marginal borrowers, because the
maximum return when borrowers pool, +R2),
is less than Astotal
wealth to be allocated increases, marginal conditions in the loan market will
change, as different borrowers are brought in on the margin. That is, changes
in the aggregate level of net worth can have allocative effects. Marginal
conditions (and the participation of particular classes of borrowers) depend
as well on the allocation of wealth ——i.e.,internal equity —-sincechanges
in this allocation can affect the profitability of lending to
information—intensive borrowers.
Proposition 1 makes precise (I) the role of internal equity in credit
allocation when full-information and information-intensive credit markets
coexist; and (ii) the extent to which "underinvesteent" in particular sectors
occurs.
Proposition 1: Depending on per capita levels of internal net worth, the
allocation of funds to classes of borrowers alternatively will
follow the full—Information credit allocation or ration funds-13-
away from information—intensive borrowers who would receive
credit in the absence of asymmetric information. A "financial
collapse" may occur, in which some or all classes of
information-intensive borrowers are denied any access to
credit.
Proof:
Within the framework described above, borrowers may be ordered in teras
of desirability depending on their project opportunities and net worth Ck.
Three possible orderings exist:
(i)
-1>p*(CH. > p*(C.1L when H,L <
(ii)P*(CH 1H R -1>p*(CL,4), when L <C(p)<H,and
(iii) p*(CH, 1H >p*(CL,
> — 1,when ILL >C(p).
Inother words, the maximum possible gross rate of return from contracts
offered to information-intensive borrowers exceeds %onlywhen borrowers with
the same (high) net worth level and different production opportunities do not
pool. This occurs only when internal net worth exceeds the critical level
Thelevel of aggregate net worth determines, for any of the three orderings,
which borrowers class received funds on the margin. The profit rate from
marginal loans sets the profit rate for inframarginal loans as well; marginal
and average profit rates ()areequal.
Under ordering N),increasingaggregate net worth causesto fall from
-Ito p*(CH, 1H) and then to p*(C1, 'L Under (ii), follows the path:
-1,ft111 -1,p*(CL, i) ft2 -1.For ordering (iii),falls from
-1to -1to -1.Thus, depending on the aggregate level and
distribution of net worth, some classes of borrowers may be rationed (i.e.,
receive a loan opportunity only through a lottery with a certain probability)-14-
or excluded entirely from the credit market.
We stress two corollaries of Proposition 1 addressing the importance of
internal equity for investment.
Corollary 1: The distribution of investment across borrower types depends on
the distribution of endowments among borrowers and savers.
Discussion:
Changes in net worth that precipitate a change in funding ordering, but
hold constant the aggregate endowment level, are borne by the marginal
borrower class. That is, some groups of borrowers may be denied credit.
These borrowers must be information-intensive. Hence, the share of
information—intensive investment in total investment can never increase when
the aggregate net worth of potential borrowers (non-S-type individuals) is
reduced, and will in general decrease. A fortiori, changes in H or L relative
to C(p) will have allocative effects.
Corollary 2: Any redistribution of funds from entrepreneurs to savers thet
change Ii or L relative to E()willreduce the share of
investment undertaken by information—intensive borrowers.
Discussiont
This corollary follows iramedietely from Proposition I and Corollary 1.
Consider a redistribution of internal finance AC from potential entrepreneurs
to be given to savers --changing(H,L,C(p)) to (H-AC,L-AC,()). If the new
internal net worth positions are such that funding ordering (iii) prevails,
the redistribution is only a transfer. If funding ordering (ii) obtains, then—15-
borrowers may not be granted loans; under funding ordering (i). the
information—intensive sector as a whole may experience financial collapse,
with most or all of mutual fund deposits invested in full—information
projects. The return on the mutual fund deposits is lower going from (iii) to
(ii) to (i). Taken together, corollaries 1 and 2 imply that financing and
investment decisions are not independent.
III. Public Policy: Some Remarks
Internal Finance and Public Finance
The simple setup of the model in section III permits some observations
about the effects of tax policy on credit allocation. We consider the
government sector as having commitments for a stream of public projects. The
government's revenue requirements depend on its endowment relative to the cost
of the exogenously specified projects. If required public spending exceeds
the endowment of the government, taxes will be levied. If the public
endowment exceeds the cost of public projects, the government becomes a net
contributor of funds to the economy-wide mutual fund.
Consider first the case in which the public sector requires additional
funds and uniform lump-sum taxes on endowments are imposed prior to credit
allocation. The effects of taxation on the allocation of funds for investment
depends both on the aggregate level of collateral and its distribution, as
would be expected from the allocations discussed before. That is, all other
things equal, reductions in the total amount of private funds should lead to an
increase in the share of investment undertaken by full-information borrowers.
Moreover, uniform (lump-sum) taxation of net worth prior to investsent-16-
reduces collateral 0f1L borrowers proportionately more than that of
borrowers, making more likely the possibility of the complete closure Of
the loan market to borrowers.
Policy-induced redistributions of money from the "corporate sector"
(individuals with project endowments) to the household sector (individuals
including those who are "savers") will in all likelihood reduce investment
profitability as it reduces the share of investment done by
information—intensive entrepreneurs. One such redistribution was accomplished
in the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-1937, in which a progressive
surcharge was placed on retained earnings to encourage payout. Dividend
payments relative to earnings increased substantially during the two years for
which the surtax was in effect (Poterba, 1961). Available evidence on
behavioral responses is sketchy, with the consensus being that large companies
issued (primarily debt) securities to raise funds externally for investment.
Small and medium-sized companies in growing industries were paying out little,
and suffered a loss in internal finance as a result of the surcharge. Surveys
cited by a contemporary chronicler suggest a decline in investment in those
groups (see the discussion in Lent, 1946). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 raises
substantially the average tax rate on corporate earnings; an analysis of its
likely effects on corporate saving is given by Poterba (1987). The Act
redistributes funds from the corporate sector to the household sector, where
average tax rates are lowered. Our model would predict that investment
decisions of information—intensive firms are affected by this redistribution.
The importance of internal finance -—particularlyfor information—
intensive borrowers —-suggeststhe possibility that the impact of tax policy—17—
on investment may be channeled as much through its effects on net cash flow
(as an addition to internal equity) as through its effects on the "cost of
capital". That is, depending on levels of internal equity, information—
intensive borrowers may face binding internal-finance contraints, with a very
high shadow price of debt—finance. For such borrowers, the effects of tax
policy on investment would come through impacts on internal equity and cash
flow and not just through changes in the full—information cost of capital in
centralized securities markets. That is, average tax rates matter as well as
marginal tax rates.13
Public Policy and Financial Institutions
The multiple-credit-markets approach outlined here sheds new light on
public policies toward financial institutions. Actual loan markets are not a
replication of an identical mutual fund. Real-world markets are characterized
not only by a multiplicity of potential contracts (differing in price or
quantity terms) at the national level, but by regional and institutional
differences as well, because of, inter alia, restrictions on the types of
securities in which certain institutions may invest and on intrastate and
interstate branch banking. The resulting diminished ability to spread risks
leaves lenders more vulnerable to deflationary shocks. For such institutions,
adverse shocks to borrowers' net worth are likely to have still more negative
effects on the availability of credit to information-intensive borrowers,
since other borrowers will have access to less localized, full-information
credit markets.
Empirical evidence from historical experience illustrates the sensitivity
of credit allocation to the responses of financial institutions to periodic-18-
episodes of deflation. That deflationary shocks can disrupt credit markets
has been suggested by Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1977). In our model, large
reductions in borrower net worth are associated with the first two funding
orderings described in the proof of proposition 1, where full-information
interest rates are high, and credit in information-intensive sectors will be
scarce, though loan rates may not rise. Support for these responses to
aggregate deflationary shocks to net worth is provided for the
pre-Federal—Reserve period in Calomiris and Hubbard (1985) and for the period
of the Great Depression of the 1930s in Bernanke (1983).
A contemporary example of aultiple market clearing In response to
deflationary shocks and reductions in internal equity is reflected in the
recent troubles of the federal Farm Credit System (FCS). Agricultural
borrowers from "banks" in the FCS are required to hold stock in the bank from
which the loan was obtained. In periods of deflation in farm prices (and land
values), default rates can be expected rise, inflicting capital losses on all
remaining borrowers. Of course, some borrowers could liquidate their loans
and refinance thea in full—inforsation credit markets. As strong (high net
worth) borrowers leave the FCS to obtain funds in full—information markets,
the cost of credit to weaker borrowers rises, worsening the adverse selection
probles and increasing the likelihood of a credit collapse (see the discussion
in Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock1 1986).
IV. Conclusion and Extensions
The principal findings of the paper were stated in the introduction. We
consider differences in equilibrium credit availability to various types of
borrowers and projects and responses to disturbances. This merger of-1.9-
full—information mnd information-intensive credit markets is an important step
toward an examination of why different forms of financial institutions and
loan contracts emerge, and what public policies toward credit markets should
Two theoretical extensions of this paper seem particularly proeising ——
(i)modeling further the dynamic accumulation of net worth, and
(Ii) motivating the existence of particular information-intensive
intermediaries. With respect to the former, it is important to consider
saving toward the threshold level of internal finance required to gain access
to particular loan markets in a stochastic cyclical context.14 An additional
element of precautionary response might be the agglomeration of internal
equity through mergers.
With respect to the second extension, given the demonstrated importance
of internal finance for the sorting of borrowers and the costs of adverse
shocks to net worth in terms of reduced credit availability, both borrowers
and lenders may choose to undertake costly investments in "information" --
"reputations"for borrowers and the development of specialized intermediaries
by lenders. For example, intermediaries could differ in the costs of
gathering information about prospective borrowers. "Banks" may be the lenders
most efficient in monitoring information-intensive loans, so that banks
failures could have real effects by destroying information capital and raising
monitoring costs in the aggregate. Alternatively, borrowers may decide to
invest in costly signals and audits in order to gain admittance to
centralized, full-information financial markets which supply funds relatively
elastically. Evidence from the mid—1930s indicates that this was one run
I-20—
response to the high number of bank failures of the early lsaos (see Butters
and Lintner, 1945). Incorporating these dynamic considerations (as for
example inthebanking aodel of Bernanke and Gertler, 1985) would add
significantly to the richness of the approach presented here.
Both of these extensions suggest the importance of research on links
between credit—market structure and the persistence of aggregate income
fluctuations. The model developed here provide a good basis for such dynamic
analysis because of its potential to describe the availability of various
types of loan contracts in response to aggregate disturbances and their iapact
on the persistence of those disturbances. The accueulation of internal
finance by borrowers is important, and cyclical fluctuations in the quantity
of funds available for internal finance will accentuate economy-wide
fluctuations in income (see also the discussion in Bernanke and Gertler, 1987;
and Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1q86). During a boom ——whencollateral levels
are high ——moresocially productive investments can be undertaken in
information—intensive sectors of the economy. These considerations may also
be significant for the evaluation of federal credit—market interventions or of
certain fiscal policies.
Finally, on an empirical level, our approach provides theoretical
eotivation for the inclusion of particular indicators of credit scarcity in
econometric work. The model yields testable hypotheses about the impact of
shocks to internal finance on loans to information-intensive borrowers (both
absolutely and relative to full-information borrowers). In particular, the
eaphasis on fluctuations in the value of internal net worth suggests useful
applications to studies of business investment and to financial crises. Such-21-
empirical tests are important as evidence of the quantitative significance of
credit rationing and as guidelines for public policy.—22—
Footnotes
1. King (1986) is unable to isolate the effects of innovatiàns in banks loans
from the effects of innovations in banks deposits, and argues, therefore, that
there is little empirical basis for distinguishing between the
liquidity-preference transmission mechanism and the loan-supply transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. Bernanke (1956) argues that non-recursive
("structural") orthgonmlizations of VAR models lend core support to the
credit-supply approach than the simple recursive method.
2. Bernanke and Gertler (1985) have addressed some of these issues in their
consideration of bank intermediation in a general equilibrium framework. Boyd
and Prescott (1986) also demonstrate that financial-intermediary coalitions
are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to
support the participants' private—information core allocations.
3. An eephasis on internal finance in the investment decision is not new.
Butters and Lintner (1945) analyzed the importance of internal finance for the
development of growing enterprises. Arguments linking cash flow and
investment are articulated in Meyer and Kuh (1957). See also Eisner (1978).
4. Srini Vasmn designates small, medium—sized, and large corporations to be,
respectively, firms with assets below $10 million, firms with assets between
$10 and $100 million, and those with assets over $100 million. He finds that
external equity finance (new share issues) is rare in general, and is
virtually nonexistent outside large firms. Smaller firms rely mainly on bank
loans and other short-term debt for external finance. Dividendpayout ratios
increase significantly with firm size (see also the analysis in McDonald and—23—
Soderstrom, 1986; and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1967a). Moreover, the
volatility of dividends and earnings are higher for small firms and their
investments and sales are more procyclical than those of larger firms
indicating a greater reliance on internal finance and the potential importance
of cash flow per se. Thus, although small firms account for a small
percentage of average investment and sales, they account for a much larger
percentage of cyclical variability in these variables. In part, this also
reflects the reliance of small firms on bank debt for external finance, since
bank loan supply is sensitive to aggregate credit cycles (see Eckstein and
Sinai, 1986).
5. Modeling specifically the allocation of capital to projects with at least
some degree of individual specificity is crucial to understanding potential
real effects of shocks to borrowers' collateral. If borrowers and lenders
were identical in their access to projects, unanticipated deflation would be,
for example, merely a redistribution of wealth,
6. it is important to consider both perfect—information and
information-intensive loan markets to motivate examination of real-world
institutions. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1987) employ a model of
costly state verification to motivate links between the level of collateral
and the availability of credit. In actual credit markets, some borrowers (our
information—intensive firms) are doubtless subject to insider (equity) and
outsider (debt) distinctions, while others (full—information firms) offer the
same information to holders of both debt and equity claims (e.g., large,
publicly traded corporations).—24—
7. Indeed, Williamson (1986) emphasizes the importance of developing
financial intermediation from first principles. While loans from
intermediaries are important to some (information—intensive) borrowers, they
are not uniformly important to all borrowers. Srini Vasan's "small,"
'medium-sized," and "large" firms (see the description in footnote 4) relied
on bank loans for 79 percent, 64 percent, and 17 percent of their external
finance, respectively.
8. lIeMezaand Webb (1987) obtain an overinvestment result within a
framework similar to ours, but different in four important respects, in that
they rely on: (i) identical distributions of project returns across
entrepreneurs (entrepreneurs differ only in their probabilities of success),
(ii) identical net worth across entrepreneurs, (iii) the existence of a
continuue of individual types (rather than some number of discretely different
types), and (iv) an exogenously determined marginal expected return to
lenders. By relaxing (i), we can obtain the sort of credit rationing
suggested by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) when collateral levels are sufficiently
low. Our multiple-markets approach relaxes (ii)-(iv) to examine the effects
of collateral changes on the allocation of credit across different types of
borrowers.
9. In the 11.5. manufacturing sector, new share issues as a source of
external finance are significant only for the very largest firms (Srini Vasan,
1985). Important recent papers by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Greenwald,
Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984) explain why asymmetric information either
eliminates effectively any reliance on external equity finance in the market
or causes suppliers of new equity to demand a large premium. Sea also the—25—
review of arguments in Greenwald and $tiglitz (1986). Myers and Majluf
consider a situation in which managers (or current owners) are better informed
about the true value of both the firm's investment opportunities and the
existing assets in place. Managers are assumed to act in the interest of
existing shareholders, and potential new investors are aware of this. Given
this set of assumptions, firms may be forced completely out of markets for
external equity finance. See also the analysis in razzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (198Th).
10. That is, we exclude interest rates that vary with a firm's performance.
There are enforcement issues raised by such contractual contingencies in debt
instruments: First, ex 22!! third-party verification must be straightforward
("id certum est quod certum reddi potest" --thatis certain which can be made
certain). Second, if the borrower can exercise influence over the outcome,
this unequal power might raise questions as to whether the contract is
negotiated "in good faith" and whether the "mutuality" test of coapensation is
satisfied. Contracting contingent on a price index does not raise these
issues, while contracting on firm performance does (for definitions of terms,
see Oawson, Harvey. and Henderson, 1982, pp. 228-38; and Kimbrough, 1974. pp.
68—70). These enforcement considerations suggest that attempts to mimic
aspects of an equity position in a limited form with interest rate
contingencies eight be an unenforceable compromise between ownership, on the
-onehand, and a fixed promise, on the other hand. It is like'y that, were
such contingent contracting feasible, it would occur as a means of charging
different loan fees to borrowers with different unobservable project
opportunities. The adverse-selection problem in our model will not be—26-
eliminated by this complication, as long as firms' realizations are less than
fully revealing of their underlying project opportunities.
11. The adverse selection result obtains because of the different
distributions of project returns for entrepreneurs of types 1 and 2. For
interest rates greater than 1, project 1 borrowers drop out, and project 2
borrowers remain.
12. The importance of collateral as borrower net worth in a project has been
emphasized by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Bernanke and Gertler (1987).
13. This emphasis on the difference between the shadow cost of internal and
external finance parallels closely the exaaination of "liquidity-constrained"
consumers in Hubbard and Judd (1986. 1987), where the effects of average, not
marginal, tax rates dominate as long as the constraint binds. Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1987b) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987) discuss
conditions under which average tax rates are relevant for the investment
decision.
14. That is, are there circumstances under which borrowers with access to
credit would turn down projects with positive net present value in order to be
able to borrow in future periods? More broadly, can fluctuations in borrower
net worth generate persistent effects on investment ("accelerator effects")?
Consider an extra period in the model, and assume that individual—
specific project opportunities are randomly distributed in each period, so
that it is not possible for lenders to learn usefully about the
characteristics and types of borrowers. In the first period, an individual
borrower is either granted a loan or not. If credit is made available in
period 1, the borrower must decide whether or not to invest, Given the—27—
significance of entrepreneurs' net worthinthe credit allocation process,
there is an important interdependence between investment decisions in the two
periods. If there were an adverse realization of project returns in the first
period, net worth positions for some borrowers may be eroded sufficiently to
preclude obtaining a loan in the second period. As long as borrowers are
optimizing over both periods, depending on expectations about the relative
expected profitability of investments made in the two periods, some borrowers
may turn down investment opportunities with positive net expected returns in
the first period in order to be more sure of obtaining a loan in the second
period, Under a full-information credit allocation with risk-neutral
borrowers, such a result would never obtain; borrowers would undertake
investment in the first period whenever the expected net present value is
positive.-28—
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